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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides a characterization of fully implementable outcomes using 
undominated Nash equilibrium, i.e .  a Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly 
dominated str ategy . The analysis is conducted in general domains in which agents 
have complete information. Our main result is that with at least three agents any 
social choice function or correspondence obeying the us ual no veto power condition 
is implementable unless s ome players are completely indifferent over all possible 
outcomes .  This result is contrasted with the more restrictive implementation 
findings with either ( unrefined) Nash equilibrium or s ubgame perfect equilibrium .  
* We wish to  thank the National Science Foundation for financial support.
Profess or Palfrey also thanks the Exxon Educational Foundation and the Alfred P. 
Sloan Foundation for supporting his fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study in 
the Behavioral Sciences . We have benefitted from comments by seminar p articipants 
at Carnegie -Mellon ,  Penn , Princeton, Stanford , SUNY-Buffalo, and USC , and from 
discussions with John Moore. 
I .  Introduction 
The implementation problem is to design a game such that a prespecified 
welfare criterion is guaranteed to be achieved by the game across a large domain of 
possible environments . As such , the implementation problem is fundamental to 
economics and its related social science disciplines .  The study of this problem 
combines the essential ingredients of game theory, social choice theory , 
theory of incentives to rigorously analyze the role institutions play 
and the 
in the 
organization of economic , political and social activity . Because the 
implementation problem is posed in terms of organizational design, its study has 
important implications of an applied nature and is directly relevant to important 
policy problems in regulation , negotiation and bargaining , and contract design . 
Because i t  lies at the juncture of several important theoretical subfields , it also 
provides important insights into the logical foundations of basic theoretical 
constructs such as equilibrium concepts and social welfare functions . 
I t  is therefore important to solve the implementation problem at a general 
level , that is , to characterize the boundaries of organizational design: exactly 
what can be implemented and according to which criteria of rational behavior . 
The least controversial notion of rational behavior is given by dominant 
s trategy equilibrium . In such an equilibrium , everyone uses a strategy which is a 
best response to any strategy profile played by others . Clearly , games whic h 
possess the property that there exists such an equilibrium across a broad domain of 
preferences have to be extremely special . This intuition is reflected in the 
negative results on dominant strategy implementation ( Gibbard [1973], Satterthwaite 
[1975 ] ) ;  Dasgupta , Hammond, and Haskin [19 79 ]  provide a summary of results in this 
area) . 
Thes e  negative results led quite naturally to the widespread use of the nuch 
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stronger form of rationality embodied in Nash equilibrium .  Nash equilibri um 
requires that each agent use a strategy which is a best response to the specifi c 
strategies being used by the other agents , introducing a form of " s trategic 
rationality" not required by dominant strategy equilibrium. In contrast to the 
case with dominant strategies , it is quite fairly easy to construct games which 
possess Nash equilibria across a broad domain of preferences . In fac t ,  with Nash 
equilibrium, the opposite problem arises there are frequently too many 
equilibria . The key to obtaining positive results in Nash implementation theory 
thus involves mechanism design techniques which eliminate undesirable equilibria . 
There have been a number of significant positive results in this area . Hurwicz 
[1979a] , Schmeidler [1980], and Walker [1981] constructed mechanisms which 
implement Walrasian and Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibria . Maskin [1977] 
provide d  a complete characterization of Nash implementable social choice 
correspondences (SCC ' s) or welfare criteria .  He showed that a condition called 
monotonicity of an SCC was necessary and essentially sufficient for implementation . 
It is known that in economic environments ,  the Pareto correspondence is 
implementable , as is the constrained Walrasian correspondence. Further ,  a result 
of Hurwicz [1979b] shows that under some regularity conditions , any Pareto optimal 
and individually rational SCC which is Nash implementable must  contain the 
Walrasian SCC . A detailed study of feasibly implementable SCC ' s in pure exchange 
environments is given in Hurwicz , Haskin , and Postlewai te [1980], while 
comprehensive surveys of the area are given by Dasgupta , Hammond, and Haskin 
[1979 ], Haskin [1986 ] , Postlewaite [1986 ] ,  and Groves and ledyard [1985] . 
Characterizations of Bayesian-Nash implementable SCC ' s  in economies with incomplete 
information are given by Postlewaite and Schmei dler [1986] , and Palfrey and 
Srivas tava [198 5 , 1986a]. 
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In this paper ,  we make two ass umptions about rational individual behavior , 
which combine the features of dominant strategy implementation and Nash 
implementation. The first ass umption ,  in the spirit of dominant strategy 
equilibrium ,  is completely "non- strategic" and simply s ays that if , regardless of 
what actions others might be taking , one is never better off and is s ometimes worse 
off taking action A instead of action B, then action A is not taken . In the 
parlance of game theory , weakly dominated strategies are not used. 
assumption is the famili ar best response (Cournot-Nash) criterion. 
The second 
Given what 
actions others are taking , one chooses an action which does at least as well as any 
other action .  
We then pose the implementation question relative to these assumptions about 
behavior .  What sec' s are consistent with this type of behavior in the sense that 
there exists an institution under which this type of behavior will exactly 
reproduce the social choice correspondence? We call this Undominated Nash 
Implementation. 
S ince the above question has been answered in great det ail for the case of 
Nash implementation ,  
Nash implementation .  
one might wonder why we are bothering to look at undominated 
One s imple reason is that we believe the undominated 
criterion is a reasonable rationality postulate and , as such , should be 
incorpor ated in the equilibrium concep t .  A second reason is that many reas onable 
welfare criteria fail to be implementable because of an indeterminacy or multiple 
equilibrium problem associated with Nash equilibrium. That is , the best response 
criteri on provides insufficient restrictions on behavior , the result being that any 
institution which is to be designed for a robust set of environments will produce 
too many Nash equilibria in at least  some of these environments . 
In a recent p aper , Moore and Repullo [1986] h ave pursued an insight also 
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exploited by Moulin [ 1979] and Crawford [ 1979] that refinements of Nash equilibrium 
permit the implementation of some additional SCCs . They demonstrate that adding a 
restriction of sequential rationality partially allevi ates this multiple 
equilibrium problem and thereby substantially expands the set of welfare criteria 
which can be implemented by carefully adding additional ''veto" stages to the 
original game . Their nearly complete characterization of this solution ,  called 
Subgame Perfect Implementation, has recently been extended by Abreu and Sen [1986] . 
In addition ,  Moore and Repullo  illustrate several important applications of 
their result by presenting a series of examples of incentive problems and 
identifying welfare criteria which cannot be implemented via Nash equilibria, but 
which can be implemented via subgame perfect equilibria. What they emphasize is 
that the addition of extra stages accomplishes more than the more famili ar method 
of adding extra s trategies in a singl.e stage game . More precisely ,  the combination 
of ( i )  adding extra strategies in an initial stage , ( i i)  adding extra stages , and 
( iii) assuming sequential rationality, accomplishes more than only adding extra 
strategies in a s ingle stage game . What we show in this p aper is that if one is 
willing to concede the condition that weakly dominated s trategies are never used in 
equilibrium , then the addition of extra stages ( and the requirement of sequential 
r ationality) is superfluous . Our main result is that with three or more agents , 
all s ocial choice correspondences s atisfying the usual no veto  power condition are 
implementable unless some agents are completely indifferent over all possible 
alternatives .  furthermore , many welfare criteria which are implementable via 
undominated Nash equilibria are not implementable via subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Conversely, if there are more than three players, then any welfare criterion which 
satisfies no veto power and is implementable via subgame perfect equilibrium is 
also implementable in a single-stage game using undominated Nash equilibrium. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows , In the next Section ,  we set up 
the model , define and explain the necessary conditions for Nash and subgame perfect 
implementation .  Then we identify a number of important welfare criteria which fail 
to be implementable in either Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect equilibrium for a 
variety of different reasons . For each of these examples we provide extremely 
simple games which successfully implement the des ired outcomes using undominated 
Nash equilibrium . In Section 3 ,  we i dentify a necessary condition for 
implementation in undominated Nash equilibrium and als o  prove that with three or 
more agents , it is sufficient for implementation of welfare criteria which satisfy 
the usual no veto power condition identified by Haskin [1977] . In Section 4, we 
state a number of extensions of this result which involve both the relaxation of 
NVP and the two person implementation problem . In Section 5 ,  we conclude with our 
views on the practical and pos itive implications of a result which appears to place 
virtually no restrictions at all on the consistency of welfare criteria with 
noncooperative behavior under conditions of c omplete information .  
II . The Model and Some Examples 
II .A The Model 
There are I agents , indexed by i-1 , 2 ,  . . .  , I .  We denote by A the set of 
alternatives . A state ( or an environment) , denoted by s ,  specifies a profile of 
preferences , one for each agent .  S denotes the set of states , and the state is 
assumed to be common knowledge among the agents . In state s ,  the preference 
ordering of agent i is denoted by Ri( s ) , which is a complete , reflexive , and 
transitive binary relation on A . pi (s) denotes the strict preference ordering 
derived from Ri ( s ) . Since s tates only distinguish preference profiles , we require 
that s ,.. s '  implies Ri( s )  ,.. R i(s ' )  for s ome i .  With this c onvention ,  each state 
represents a unique preference profile , and there are no redundant states . 
F 
A S ocial Choice Correspondence (SCC) is a possibly multivalued mapping 
S �A . For each state of the economy , it specifies a set of alt ernatives . 
A mechanism is a pair (M ,  g) , where M - M lxM2x . . .  xM I and g is a function 
g : M A . Mi is the message space of agent i ,  and g is the allocation rule or 
outcome function .  Mi serves as the s trategy set of i at all s E s. Let wi 
MlxM2x . . .  xMi - l xMi+lx . . .  Mr, with m- i E M- i . 
Definition 1 :  mi E Mi i s  a best response for i to m- i E M- i at s tate s if 
g(m- i , mi )Ri ( s ) g(m- i , mi ) for all mi E Mi .
Definition 2 :  m - (ml , . . .  , ml) E M is a Nash equilibrium at s if for all i ,  rn1 is a 
best response to m- i at state s .  
If m is a Nash equilibrium at state s ,  then g(m) is called an equilibrium 
outcome at s .  Let NE ( s )  denote the set of all Nash equilibri um outcomes a t  s .  
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Definition 3: F is implemented in Nash equilibrium (by the mechanism (M, g) ) if for 
all s ,  F ( s) - NE( s). 
We turn next to Nash equilibria which do not involve the use of weakly 
dominated s trategies . We call such equilibria undominated Nash equilibria (see van 
Damme [1983], p . 31) . 
Definition 4 :  A Nash equilibrium, m , is weakly dominated at s if there exists 
and mi E Mi such that 
g ( m- i , mi)Ri (s)g ( m- i , mi) for all m- i E M- iand 
g( m- i , mi)pi ( s)g ( m- i , mi) for some m- i E M- i . 
This definition simply states that by playing the alternative strategy mi , agent i 
is never worse off relative to playing mi and he is strictly better off for some 
strategy combination of the other agents . 
Definition 5 :  m E M i s  an undominated Nash equilibrium (UNE) at s if m is a Nash 
equilibrium at s which is not weakly dominated at s .  
Let UNE(s) - { g(m) I m i s  a UNE a t  s ) denote the set of undominated Nash
equilibrium outcomes at s .  
Definition 6 :  F is implemented in tmdominated Nash equilibrium (by the mechanism 
(M , g)) if for all s ,  F(s) - UNE(s). 
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II . B Examples 
We turn next to a series of examples which illustrate that a number of 
important SGG' s fail to be Nash or subgame perfect implementable . 
For Nash implementation, Maskin [1977] identified monotonicity as a very 
s imple and intuitive necessary condition for implementation :  
Definition 7: F is monotonic if for all s , s ' : 
If :  ( i )  x E F(s) 
( i i) For all i ,  y EA, x Ri ( s)  y � x Ri (s ' )  y 
Then: x E F(s ' )  
Roughly speaking , this says that if x is in the s ocial choice set at s ,  and the 
upper contour set relati ve to x does not expand for anyone at state s ' , then x must 
also be in the s ocial choice set at s ' . To see why this is a necessary condition 
for Nash implementation is straightforward . Suppose that some game implements F ,  
and x E F(s) is an equilibrium outcome at s .  S ince everything preferred t o  x at s '  
must also have been preferred to x a t  s for all agents of the game , the Nas h 
equilibrium which generated x as an outcome at s must still be an equilibrium at 
s ' .  S ince by assumption the game implements F ,  this implies that x lies in F ( s ' ) .  
If the domain of F includes a sufficiently large set of possible preference 
profiles , then monotonicity turns out to be extremely restrictive , the conclusion 
being that essentially no single valued s ocial choice correspondence ( i . e .  a social 
choice function) is Nash implementable . With some fairly s trong assumptions on 
the domain , s ome more positive results emerge with respect to mul tivalued 
correspondences . For example , the ( "constrained" ) Walrasian correspondence is 
implementable in economic environments . However , in more general environments , 
even apparently reasonable correspondences are not Nash implementable . 1he 
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following example shows this for the Pareto correspondence (This example was 
pointed out to us by Faruk Gul) . 
Example 1 :  Pareto Optimality 
There are 3 alternatives , A= (x , y , z } , 2 states , S= ( s , s '  } ,  and 3 agents . 
are g iven by : 




R1 ( s ' )
xy 
z 





The Pareto correspondence evaluated at these two states is F(s )= (x ,y }  and 
F(s ' )= ( y} . Unfortunately, monotonicity requires that x E F(s ' ) ,  and F is therefore 
not implementable Nash equilibrium . We remark that the Pareto correspondence is 
monotonic if S is restricted to strict orders on A or if ( S , A} correspond to 
neoclass ical , pure exchange , economic environments . 
the Pareto correspondence is not monotonic . 
As a general rule , however, 
Example 2: Plurality Rule (from Abreu and Sen {1986)) 
There are 3 alternatives , A= ( x , y , z } , 2 states , S=( s , s '  } ,  and 3 agents . 
are g iven by : 













Suppose the welfare criterion picks the alternative which is the first choice of 
the most number of agents , and otherwise uses an arbitrary tiebreaking procedure , 
say alphabetical order .  Then we get F(s)=x and F (s '  ) =y .  
that we must have x E F(s ' ) .  
Example 3 :  Borda Count (and weak majority rule) 
But monotonicity implies 
There are 3 alternatives ,  A= (x ,y , z } , 2 states , S= ( s , s ' } ,  and 5 agents . Preferences 
are given by : 
R1 (s)=R2 ( s )  R3 ( s )  R4 ( s )=R5 ( s )  R1 ( s ' )=R2(s ' )  R3 ( s ' )  R4 ( s ' ) =R5 ( s ' ) 
(2) x y z (2) x (1) yz ( 2 )  z 
(0) y z y ( - 1) yz (-2) x (0) y 
( -2) z x x (-2) x 
The (adjusted) Borda count (see Black [1958] )  for each alternative in each 
preference ordering is given in parentheses and equals the number of alternatives 
ranked below the particular alternative in question minus the number of other 
alternati ves ranked above it . This example is set up so that there is a unique 
Borda winner in each case s o  F(s )=y , F ( s ' )=z . Both y and z are als o  weak maj ority 
winners at s and s '  respectively. But monotonicity would require that y E F (s ' ) .  
Example 4: Majority Rule 
There are 5 alternatives , A- ( v, w , x ,y , z } , 2 states , S=( s , s ' } ,  and 3 agents . 
Preferences are given by : 
R1 ( s ) R2 (s )=R2 (s ' )  R3 (s )=R3 ( s ' )
v v w z 
y z x x 
z y y y 
x x z v 
w w v w 
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The form of 11l3.jority rule we have in mind is that the welfare criterion picks a 
maj ority rule winner if one exists ( i . e .  if there exists an alternative which be ats 
e ach other alternative in a pairwise vote ) .  If there does not exist a majority 
rule winner ,  then the Pareto rule is followed . To avoid the problem illustrated in 
Example 1 ,  we consider only strict orders . The 
correspondence , e valuated at these two environments 
implied soc ial choice 
is F(s )- ( v, w, x , y , z )  and 
F(s ' )-z .  However ,  monotonicity implies that F(s ' )  should also contain v, w, and x .  
Many other examples can be constructed using m:>re elaborate combinations of 
maj ority choice and scoring rules mich yield nonmonotonic social choice 
correspondences in the context of natural ( and actually used) performance measures . 
These include the runoff systems for determining a winner in a multicandidate 
election when no clear maj ority winner exists , s ingle and double elimination 
tournaments , and examples from economic environments such as the ones contained in 
there exists a finite sequence of allocations in B , ao 
and a sequence of agents , j (O) , j (l) , . . .  , j ( i) such that 
(i )  akRj (k) ( s ) ak+l for k-0 , 1 , 2 ,  . . .  , i- 1
( ii )  a2Rj ( i) ( s ) a2+1 and a2+l pj ( i) ( s ' ) a2
(iii ) ak is not Rj (k) ( s ' )  maximal for j (k) in B , j-1 , 2 ,  . . .  , i
( i v) j ( i) � j ( i- 1 )  or i-0 ,  if a2+1 is Ri (s ' )  maximal in B for all i � j ( i) .
Given this condition, it is relatively straightforward to verify whether or not 
a given F is subgame perfect implementable . Consider Example 1 .  From part (ii) of 
condition a it must be the case that since x E F(s) but x � F (s ' ) ,  then there is an 
agent i and a p air of outcomes (b , c) such that bRi ( s )c and cP i( s ' ) b .  S ince this is 
not the case for the SCC used in this example it follows immediately that the 
Pareto correspondence is not sub game perfect implementable . The following game in 
which only agents 1 and 2 play ,  .implements this F using undominated Nash 
Moore and Repullo [1986]. equilibrium : 
In fact the motivation for Moore and Repullo ' s  examples was to show how much 
more powerful subgame perfect implementation is compared to (unrefined) Nash 
equilibrium . In the remainder of this section, we demonstrate that none of the 
correspondences illustrated in examples 1 -4 are sub game perfect implementable . We 
then show via examples in this section and in rigorous generality in the next 
section that all four of them ( and indeed almost  any correspondence ,  including 
"economic" criteria ,  Pareto criteria, scoring rules and 11l3.j ority-based schemes ) are 
implementable in undominated Nash equilibrium . 
A precise necessary condition for subgame perfect implementation is given by 
Abreu and Sen [1986] : 
Definition 8 :  F sat isfies Condition a if there exists B h A and B 2 range F such 
that for all s and s ' , if x E F(s ) and x � F (s ' ) ,  then 
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In state s, the pair (6 ,6) and ({3,/3) are both undominated Nash equilibria. 
However ,  in state s ' , only (6, 6) is an undominated Nash equilibrium , since 6 is 
weakly dominated by f3 for agent 1 .  
Next ,  consider Example 2 .  Abreu and Sen [ 1986 J have shown that this SCC 
violates Condition a s ince for all sequences j (O) , . . .  , j ( i) and x 
ai+l • x is Rj (O) ( s ' )  maximal for j (O) . F is therefore not subgame perfect
12 




BE S BES z 
f3 y z 
'Y z y 
Agent 2 plays S Agent 2 plays f3 
In the game , agents 1 and 2 each have two strategies ,  S and f3, while agent 3 has 
three strategies , S, f3, and 'Y· Agent 2 chooses a matrix , agent 1 chooses a 
column , and agent 3 c hooses a row .  The unique undominated Nash equilibrium a t  s is 
( S  , S  , S) and t he unique undominated Nash equilibrium at s '  is ({3,{3,-y) , so that this 
game implements F .  
Next , consider Example 3 .  
subgame perfect implementable . 





Agent 1 plays S 
For the same reason as in Example 1 ,  F is not 
However , the following game implements F in 
s � 
f3 GTI 
Agent 1 plays f3 
Here , agents 4 and 5 do not play the game , agent 1 chooses a matrix , agent 
c hooses a column and agent 3 chooses a row . Here ,  ( S  , {3, S) is the unique \NE at s 
w hile ({3 , S,{3) is the unique UNE at s ' , s o  this game implements F .  
Finally , consider Example 4 . Here , there does exist an agent and a pair of 
alternatives for which that agent ' s  preferences are reversed between s and s' as 
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required by part (ii) of Condition a .  However ,  Condition a requires that v, w E 
F (s ' ) .  To see this for w ,  consider any pair of sequences w = ao, a1 , . . . .  , a£+1 and 
j (O) , j ( l ) , . . .  , j ( £) .  We cannot have j (O) =2 since w is R2 ( s ' ) maximal . I f  j (O) -
1 or j (O) - 3, then part ( i )  of the condition requires w Rj (O) ( s )a1 which implies
Now we cannot have j ( 1 )  2 for the same reason as above , and the same 
argument as above for agents 2 and 3 implies a 2 - a1 - 1') w. Continuing 
inductively , there is m pair of sequences satisfying Condition a, s o  we ITUSt have 
w E F(s ' ) .  A similar argument applies to v. We cannot have j (0) 1 since v is 
Rl ( s )  maximal . If j (O ) - 2 ,  then a1 = ao v .  If j (O ) 3 ,  then a1 v or a1= w .
If a1 - w ,  we  have the same problem as in  the case of ao  = w. Thus we ITUS t have 
a1-v, and the argument repeats itself . Thus , F is not subgame implementable , the 
reason being the lack of a test sequence satisfying Condition a. On the other 
hand, this example satisfies all the requirements of Theorem 2 of the next Section , 
and is therefore undominated Nash implementable . 
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II I. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 
This section contains our main results on UNE implementable SCC' s. We will 
show that an extremely weak condition , termed property Q, is necessary for 
implementation . If t here are at least three agents and no veto power holds , then 
it is also sufficient for implementation . 
Definition 7: F satisfies Property Q if for any s , s ' , if for all i ,  Ri (s ) "' 
Ri (s ' )  implies for all a , b  E A, aRi (s ' )b ,  then x E F(s) � x E F(s ' ) .  
The condition says that if x is an element of F(s ) and the only difference 
between preferences at s and s '  is that at s '  some agents are completely 
indifferent between all alternatives , then x must also lie in F(s ' ) .  
I t  is s traightforward to see that property Q is necessary for undominated Nash 
implementation. If x is a UNE outcome at s and preferences at s '  are either the 
same as at s or exhibit complete indifference , then x is also a UNE outcome at s '  
so we must have x E F(s ' ) .  Formally we state : 
Theorem 1 :  I f  F is UNE implementable , then F satisfies property Q. 
We note that property Q is also a necessary condition for Nash implementation 
and for subgame perfect implementation . 
Property Q is an extremely weak condition , and consequently, it is not 
surprising that it is necessary for implementation . What is surprising is that 
with the (usual) additional requirements of three or more agents and no veto power , 
it is sufficient for UNE implementation . We now turn to this . 
The definition of implementation of an SCC has two parts to it . The first part 
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requires that every element of the sec be an equilibrium o utcome (" truthf ul 
implementation" ) ,  while the second part requires that every equilibrium outcome be 
an element of F .  To implement an sec, therefore , w e  have t o  ensure that a t  s ,  all 
elements of F(s) are equilibrium outcomes and that nothing outsi de F(s) ever arises 
in equilibrium . In the complete information enviro nments we are analyzing, the 
first part is easy to accomplis h; the difficulty arises in ensuring the second 
part .  For example , suppose x E F(s) but x � F(s ' ) .  Then , we have to ensure that x 
is an equilibrium outcome at s but not at s ' , so that at s ' , we have to eliminate x 
as a potential equilibrium outcome . The role of property Q in eliminating such 
outcomes is illustrated by the following examples . It is useful for this purpose 
to re-write property Q as follows . 
Definition 9 ' :  F satisfies Property Q if for any s , s ' , if x E F(s )  and 
x � F(s ' ) ,  then either 
(i) there exists i and a , b  E A  with aPi(s )b and bRi(s ' )a and there exist 
c , d  E A  with cPi(s ' ) d  
or (ii) there exists i and a , b  E A  with aRi(s )b and bPi(s ' )a .  
This states that i f  x E F(s ) and x � F(s ' )  then there must exist some agent 
with different preferences between the two states and that this agent cannot be 
completely indifferent between all alternatives at s '  . This lack of complete 
indifference at s '  need not be stated explicitly in ( i) s ince t he statement 
bPi(s ' )a implies i t .  Definition 9 '  is thus equivalent to Definition 9 .  It is now 
straightforward to see that (ii )  of Condition a implies (ii )  of Definition 9 ' and 
that Property Q is strictly weaker than Condition a .
We turn next to some examples . All the examples have two states and two 
agents . 
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Example 5: A � (x , y , z , w), S - (s , s ' ), I 2. Both agents have identical 
preferences in the two states , given by : 





Let F ( s )  - {x ,y) F (s ' )  - (x). Here , y E  F(s )  and yfl F(s ' ) .  Part ( i )  and part 
( i i )  of Definition 9' are both satisfied by agent 1 s ince zp1 (s )w but wP1( s ' ) z .  
The following game implements F: 
a 
fJ 
There are two Nash equilibria to this game at both s and s' : (a,a) yielding y as 
the outcome and ({J,1) yielding x as the outcome . At s , neither of these equilibria 
is weakly dominated; for example , playing fJ does not weakly dominate for player 1 
because zp 1 ( s )w .  A t  s '  , however, fJ weakly dominates a for player 1 ,  since now 
wP1 ( s ' ) z .  The only undominated Nash equilibrium at s '  is ({J,1), yielding x as the 
unique UNE outcome at s ' . F is therefore UNE implementable . 
In the above example , we eliminated y as an equilibrium outcome at s '  by 
exploiting a reversal of strict preferences between s and s ' .  In the next example , 
we illustrate how a similar type of construction is p ossible when for some player 
s trict preference at s changes to indifference at s ' . 
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Example 6 :  A �  {x, y , z), S 2. Both agents have i dentical pre ferences




s s '  
x 
y , z  
Let F(s ) (x ,y), F(s ' )  - {x). Here,  agent 1 satisfies (i) of Definition 9' . The 
following game implements F in UNE : 
Agent 2 
a fJ 
a EEB fJ 
There are two Nash equilibria to this !'Pme at both s and s ' , (a,a) and ({J,{J). At 
s ,  neither (a,a) nor ({J,{J) is not weakly dominate d  for either player . At s ' , 
however, fJ weakly dominates a for player 2 and fJ weakly dominates a for player 2 . 
Thus , both x and y are UNE outcomes at s while x is the unique UNE outcome at s ' , 
and s o  F is UNE implementable . 
In the next example , we consider the case of an indifference at s becoming a 
strict preference at s' which is (ii )  of Definition 9 ' . This turns out to be the 
most difficult case , and requires the construction of a game with infinite strategy 
sets for the agents . 
Example 7: A - {x , y , z ,w), S 




z , w  





(s ,s ' ), I - 2 .  Both agents have identical 
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Let F(s) � (x,y} F( s' ) � (x}. Here, y E F( s) and y <E F( s' ) .
Definition 9 '  i s  satisfied by agent 1 since wR 1 ( s) z  but zp1 ( s' )w .
game implements F :  
an a, a- a. a, a. a, 
ao x z z z z z z 
a1 z y w w w w w 
a2 z y z w w w w 
Agent 1 a3 z y z z w w w 
a4 z y z z z w w 
a5 z y z z z z w 
Part (ii) of 
The following 
There are an infinite number of Nash equilibria to this game at both s and s' : 
( a0,a0) yielding x as the outcome and ( ak,a1) yielding y as the outcome for all k � 
1. At s, none of these equilibria are weakly dominated, since both players are
indifferent between z and w .  At s I ' oowever ' ak+1 weakly dominates "k for player 
1, since now z is preferred to w .  The only undominated Nash equilibrium a t  s' is 
( a0 ,a0) ,  yielding x as the unique UNE outcome at s' . F is therefore UNE 
implementable. Note that if this game is truncated at any point, say at "k for 
agent 1, then ( ak,a1) becomes an undominated Nash equilibrium at s' .
These examples illustrate how any change in preferences, except a change to 
complete indifference, can be used to eliminate undesired equilibria; in all of 
them, the problem was to eliminate y as an equilibrium outcome at s' . The 
mechanism constructed below to prove suffici ency is a general formulation of the 
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intuition behind these examples, and relies heavily on the line of argument used in 
example 7. The proof also requires the following no veto power condition . 
Definition 8: F satisfies no veto power if for all s, whenever aRi ( s)b for all y E 
A and for at least I - 1 agents, x E F( s) . 
Theorem 2 :  If F is satisfies property Q and no veto power, and I ;,; 3 ,  then F is 
implementable in undominated Nash equilibrium .  
Proof :  We prove the theorem first for the special case in >klich in each state, 
each agent has a best and worst element . 
changes when this assumption is relaxed . 
such that for all s, 
At the end, we indicate how the proof 
For each i define b i: S->A and wi : S->A, 
bi ( s) E Bi ( s) - { x I x Ri ( s) z for all z E A J and 
wi ( s) E wi ( s) - { x I z Ri ( s) x for all z EA ). 
element for i at s and wi ( s) a worst element for i at s. 
We will call b i( s) a best 
Before proceeding to the suffici ency proof, we need a little more notation. 
For any s and s' , if part ( i )  of Definition 9 '  holds, define i 1( s,s' ) ,  y 1( s,s' ) ,  
and y2( s,s' ) to b e  the agent and pair of allocations such that y1Pi ( s)y2 and 
If part ( ii )  of Definition 9' holds, define � (s, s' ) ,  z, (s, s' ) ,  and 
z2( s,s' ) to be the agent and pair of allocations such that z1Ri ( s) z2 and 




Mi _ Mi i i i i l x M2 x M3 x M4 x MS and
Mi - {<x , s ) I x E F(s) , s E S } 
Mi - S2 { -4 , - 3 , 2 ,  -1 , 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . } { 0 , 1 , 2 ,  . . .  } 
s 
To define the allocation rule, g ,  we divide the rressage space into a number of 
regions . 
mj - (x , s , s , 0 , 0 , s ) vj} 
Vj , mj = (x , s , s , 0 , 0 , s ) , or mj - (x , s , s '  , - 1 ,kj , sj ) and j - i 1(s , s ') ,
or mj - (x , s , s '  , - 3 , kj , sj ) and j = i2( s , s ' )  ; m � D1 } 
V j � i ,  mj = (x , s , s , 0 , 0 , s ) , or mj - (x , s , s '  , - 1 , kj , sj )
and j = i1 ( s , s ' ) ,  or mj = (x , s , s ' , - 3 , kj , sj ) and j = i2(s , s ' )
m � D1 U D2 } 
V j � i ,  mj - (x , s , s " , - 2 , 0 , s )  ; i = i 1  (s , s " )  ; 
m1 - (x , s , s , 0 , 0 , s ) , or mi = (x , s , s '  , - 3 , ki , s i) and i - i2 ( s ,  s ' )
V j � i ,  mj = (x , s , s " , - 2 , 0  , s ) ; max kj > 0 ;·�i 
i - i1 ( s ,  s " )  ; 
i i J' i i m = (x , s , s , 0 , 0 , s ) , or m = (x , s , s  , - 3 k , s ) 
V j � i ,  mj - (x , s , s ' , - 2 , 0 , s ) ;
i ( ' 1 ki i) . . ( ') } ffi = X J $IS I - I I$ ; }_ "'° 11 $I$ 
and i - i2( s , s ' ) 
V j � i mj = (x s s" - 2 kj s) · i - i (s s " )  ·I I I I I I I 1 I I 
i ( ' 1 ki i) d . . ( ' )  i } m = x , s , s  , - , , s  an i = 11 s , s  ; m � n6A 
V j � i ,  mj - (x , s , s " , - 2 ,kj , s )  ; i � i 1  (s , s " )
m 1  = (x , s , s , 0 , 0 , s ) , or m1 = (x , s , s ' , - 1 , k1 , s1 )  and i = i1 (s , s ' ) ,  




't/ j � i ,  rnj = (x , s , s " , -4 , 0 , s )  ; i = i2(s , s " )  ; 
mi = (x , s , s , 0 , 0 , s ) , or m1 = (x , s , s '  , - l , k1 , si ) and i - 11 (s , s ' ) } 
V j � i ,  mj - (x , s , s " , -4 , kj , s ) ; max kj > 0 ;  i = i 2(s , s " )  ;·�i 
i i J' i i } m - (x , s , s , 0 , 0 , s ) ,  or m - (x , s , s  , - 1 , k  , s  ) and i - i 1  (s , s ' )  
V j � i ,  mj = (x , s , s '  , -4 , 0 , s )  ;
mi - (x , s , s '  , - 3 , k1 , s 1 ) ; i = i2(s , s ' ) } 
V j � i ,  mj = (x , s , s " , -4 , kj , s )  ; i - i2( s , s " )  ; 
mi - (x , s , s '  , - 3 , k1 , s i) and i - i2(s , s ' )  ; m � D�B } 
V • � • j - ( " 4 kj ) . . . ( " )J r- J. I ffi XI$ I$ I - I I$ I }. ;i' 12 $I$ 
mi - (x , s , s , 0 , 0 , s ) ,  or mi - (x , s , s '  , - l , k1 , s 1 )  
or mi = (x , s , s '  , - 3 , ki , s i) and i = i2(s , s ' ) } 
V j � i ,  mj = (x , s , s , i , 0 , s ) ;
mi = (x , s , s , 0 , 0 , s ) , or mi - (x , s , s ' , - 1 , ki , si) 
or mi = (x , s , s '  , - 3 , ki , si) and i = i2(s , s ' )  } 
V j � i ,  mj = (x , s , s , i , O , s )  ; m � D�A } 
m � Dl u 02 u [ 'i o; u . . . 'i D�B ] } 
and i i1 ( s , s ' ) ,  
and i = i 1  ( s , s ' )  
For m E 010 , l et r* = { i I max {0 , m; ) � max {0 , m� ) for all j )
and let i* = min {i ) .  
iEI* 
i z (s s " )  let z*(si s s " )  _ { z1 ( s , s " )  if z1 (s , s " )Ri (si) z 2 ( s , s " )For any ' ' ' , z2 ( s ,  su) otherwise 
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The allocation rule is  defined as follows. 
x if m E Dl
x if m E D2
wi ( s) if m E Di3
Y1 ( s  , s" )  if 
i m E D4A
wi ( s" )  if m E i DSA
Yz( s, s' ) if 
i m E D6A
bi ( si) if i m E D7A 
wi ( s" )  if i m E D7A 
bi ( si ) if i m E D8A 
wi ( s" ) if i m E D8A g(m) - i z1 ( s  , s" )  if m E D4B
z1 ( s, s" )  if i m E DSB
z2 ( s, s' ) if m E i D6B
z* ( si , s, s" )  if i m E D7B
z1 ( s, s" )  if i m E D7B
wi ( s" )  if i m E DBB
bi ( s) if i m E D9A
wi ( s) if i m E D9B






ki > max kj
ki 
j "'i 
kj ,.; max 
j "'i i m3-- l and





ki > max kj
ki 
j "'i 
kj ,.; max 
j "'i 
Discussion of the mechanism :  
It i s  unfortunate that the formal definition of the mechanism appears 
impenetrable. The mechanism although complicated ,  is actually quite intuitive. 
Therefore, as a prelude to the formal proof , we attempt to make this  intuition 
accessible  by informally describing the basic structure of the rressage space and 
the allocation rule. 
A. Message space, M: 
The message space has five components. The first component , (x , s) ,  consists of 
a state and a permissible  (by F) social choice at that state. If F were single 
valued , and we think of i ' s " type" as a conditional distribution on S ,  then a 
"direct" mechanism would use a rressage space identical to this  first component . 
The mechanism will be rigged so that in equilibrium agents must essentially always 
agree to the state. The second and third components are used j ointly by agents to 
"obj ect" to the state that others are claiming, or alternatively , to approve of 
someone's obj ections. The messages (-1 -3 ) in M; are "obj ection 
iare "obj ection approval flags. " If i r aises a - 1 flag ,  then m1
flags" and (-l., -4) 
i (x , s) and m2 - s'
must be such that i-i, ( s' s' ) . If i raises a - 3 flag ,  i then m1 and 
i m2 must be such
that i-i2 ( s' s' ) . Furthermore, when agent j sends a - 2 flag and reports m{ - (x , s)
i s' ' he only gives permission to i 1  ( s, s' )  to raise a -1 flag. S imilarly j ' sm2 -
partial message (x , s, s' , -4) only gives i2( s, s' )  permission to r ai se a - 3 flag .  The 
positive integers in M; are used to create a 1 rat -rac e1 1 when there i s  disagreement
among some players over M1 , or if some players are sending otherwise inappropriate 
messages. The l atter can occur for example if i ' s  message is  (x , s , s' , - 1 ,. , . )  but 
i"'i1  ( s, s' ) .  Thi s  rat -race has no equilibrium ,  since each player wishes to report 
a higher integer than the other players. 
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The integers in D4 are used to create a 11tail-chasing11 phenomenon for an agent. 
That is, an agent always wishes to say a higher integer than himself. This feature 
was i llustrated earlier in example 7 .  i The last component of the message s pace, M5,
is used out of equilibrium in conjunction with M4 to make sure that i wants to
chase his own tail . If he happens to say the highest M4 integer, then he will 
receive a best element evaluated at M; ( i . e .  bi (m�) ) .
In s ummary, the regions of the message space are defined as follows . Region 1 
is the "equilibrium" region; here, there is total agreement and typical UNE' s lie 
in this region . In region 2, at least one player has raised an objection flag but 
no permission flags have been raised; otherwise, there is total agreement . Regions 
3 to 9B are indexed by i. Region 3 consists of i llegitimate unilateral deviations 
by i from total agreement . In regions 4A to BA all j ,..i have given i permission to 
make a - 1 objection. Similarly, in regions 4B to BB all j ,..i have given i 
permission to Imke a -3 obj ection . In region 9, agents j ;«i jointly grant i the 
right to choose between his most preferred outcome (9A) and his least preferred 
outcome ( 9B) .  Finally, in region 10, the agent with the highest  M4 integer chooses 
his most  preferred outcome . 
B . Allocation rule, g: 
The mechanism is set up so that it has the following intuitive features :  
( 1 )  Equilibria always involve total agreement (generically (x,s,s ,0,0,s ) ) . 
( 2 )  Obj ections by i are ignored unless everyone else gives i approval. 
( 3 )  Unilateral deviations from total agreement (other than appropriate 
obj ections ) are punished. 
(4) Approved obj ections lead to e ither "rat-races " or "tail- chasing . "
(5) Unapproved obj ections (D2) lead to " tail -chasing . "  
2 5  
In order t o  prove the theorem, we have to show that for all s, F(s )  - UNE(s ) .
This is done in the following Lemmas . The first two Lemmas show that for any s 
and for any x E F(s ) ,  mj- (x,s ,s ,0,0,s ) Vj is a UNE at s ,  leading to the conclusion
that for all s ,  F(s ) c UNE (s ) , The first Lemma shows that such a strategy is a 
Nash equilibrium at s .  
Lemma 1 :  At s , for any x e F(s ) ,  mj 
equilibrium . 
(x,s,s ,0,0,s ) for all j is a Nash
Proof: Any unilateral deviation by i moves the aggregate message from n1 to
i either D2 or n3 . In e ither case, i is no better off .
•
The next lemma shows that the strategy described in Lemma 1 is not weakly 
dominated at s for any agent . This is somewhat complicated by the fact that we 
need to examine what happens for every possible strategy of the other agents . 
i i Regions D4A and D4B are used to ensure that at s ,  there does not exist s '  such
i i i i i-i 1 ( s ,s ' )  will deviate by saying (x,s ,s '  ,-1,k s ) ;  regions n4B to n6B are
used to ensure that at s,  there does not exist s '  such that i-i2( s ,s ' )  will 
deviate by saying (x,s ,s ' ,- 3 ,ki ,si ) ;  regions D;, n!A and n!Bare use to ensure
that no other type of agent will deviate in any way, 
Lemma 2 :  At s, for any x E F(s ) , mj - (x,s,s ,0,0,s )  for all 
dominated. 
Proof: See Appendix . 
is not weakly 
Lemmas 1 and 2 yield that for all s, F(s ) c UNE (s ) . We now show that for all s, 
UNE(s ) c F (s ) . The next Lemma examines the poss ibility of equilibria outside D1 and
D2, and uses no veto power to ensure that any such equilibrium will produce
outcomes in the social choice correspondence .  The region n10 plays an essential
role in this argument . i Note that in·n10, any agent reporting m3 which is strictly
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positive and strictly greater than m� Vj�i can obtain his most  preferred
al ternative at  the true state. 
Lemma 3 :  At any s ,  if m is a UNE and m ¢ o1 u o2 , then g(m) E F(s ) .
Proof : If m is a Nash equilibrium and m ¢ o1u o2 , then we claim that the
hypothesis of no Veto power is satisfied. To see this , observe that outs ide 
of D1 u D2 , there are always at l eas t I - 1 agents each of whom can unilaterally
move the aggregate message to 010 and obtain their bes t  element at s .  Hence, if
. i i m is a Nash equilibrium and m ¢ D1u D2 , i t  mus t be the case that g(m)R (s)b ( s )
for at  l east I - 1  agents . No veto power then yields g (m) E F(s) .. Since UNE( s )  
C NE( s ) , the conclusion follows . • 
Lemma 3 takes care of all equilibria outside o1 and o2 , and we turn next to
possible equilibria in D1 and D2 . The next Lemma considers the s et of equilibria
in It shows that  if x E F(s) is an equilibrium outcome at s ' , then x E F(s ' ) .  
W e  show that if x ¢ F (s ' ) ,  then i 1 ( s , s ' )  or i2(s , s ' )  should deviate by saying
(x , s , s ' , - 1 , ki , s ' )  or (x , s , s '  , - 3 , ki , s ' )  res pectively .
Lemma 4 :  I f  m (x , s , s , 0 , 0 , s )  Vj  is a UNE at s ' , then x E F(s ' ) .  
Proof: S ee Appendix. 
Finally , we examine possible equilibria in o2 . The argument here relies
heavily on the idea behind Example 7 ; we esentially argue that any strategy of 
the type (x , s , s '  , - 1 , ki , s ' )  is weakly dominated by (x, s , s '  , - 1 , ki+l , s ' )  and that
any s trategy of the type (x , s , s '  , - 3 , ki , s ' )  is weakly dominated by
(x , s , s '  , - 1 , ki+l , s ' ) .
Lemma 5: Suppose m E D2 is a UNE at s '  with m� - (x , s ) Vj. Then ,  x E F(s ' ) .
froof : S ee Appendix. 
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To complete the proof of the Theorem, Lemmas 1 and 2 show that F (s )  c UNE ( s ) , 
while Lemmas 3 - 5 show that if m is a UNE at s ,  g(m) E F(s) , i . e . UNE (s )  c F(s) . 
These yield F(s ) - UNE( s )  Vs . 
Finally, we indicate how the mechanism has to be modified when some or all 
agents have no best  or wors t elements at some states .  
If agent i has no worst element, the outcomes in the various regions have to 
be changed as follows: i i in D3 and D9 8  to something strictly wors e than x at s
preferences ; in o;A and D�A to something s trictly worse than bo th y 1 ( s , s " )  and
i i y2(s , s " )  at s" preferences ; in DBA ' w ( s " )  should be replaced by x if i�i2( s , s " )
and z1 ( s , s " )  if i-i2 ( s , s " ) . 
i i If agent i has no best  element, then y (s ) should be replaced by something
i i  i i i i is trictly better than w (s ) at s preferences in D7A and DBA' In o9A, y ( s )
should be replaced by something strictly better than the outcome in o! 8 at s
preferences . In 010 , define a s equence {b ) with y p
i*(mi*) yn Vn , and letn n+l 5 
i* the outcome be yn where n-m4
This concludes the proof of the theorem .• 
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IV. Discussion and Extensions
In this section, we consider extensions of Theorem 2 .  Our first extension 
deals with relaxing the ro veto power condition . While no wto power is a very 
weak restriction ( for example, it i s  vacuously satisfied in pure exchange 
economies) , it can sometimes impose undesir able restrictions on a welfare 
criterion . Thi s  is i llustrated by the following example, >hich shows that ro veto 
power can be inconsistent with Pareto optimality, and also that it is not necessary 
for UNE implementation. 
Example 8: (No veto power and Pareto optimality) 
There are 3 alternati ves, A =  (x , y , z ) , 2 states, S - ( s, s' ), and 3 agents. 
Preferences are given by : 




R2( s) - R2( s' )  - R3( s) - R3( s' )
x , y  
z 
The P areto optimal SCC for thi s  example is  given by F ( s) - (x), F( s' ) - ( x ,y) .  No 
veto power requires that y E F (s) , so that F does not satisfy the requirements of 
Theorem 2 .  However , F i s  implemented in undominated Nash equilibrium by the 
following trivial game: 
Agent 1 
a D /iD 
At s, a i s  the unique undominated Nash equilibrium yielding x as the equilibrium 
o utcome while at s' , both a and fi are undominated Nash equilibria yielding x and y
as UNE o utcomes. 
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The following assumptions, which are weaker than no veto power, apply to 
situations similar to the one above. 
Weak NVP: For all s,s' , for all i ,  wi ( s) n [ n Bi ( s' ) ]  c F ( s' ) .
j "'i 
Unanimity: c F ( s' ) 
Weak NVP says that if a worst element for i at s is a best element at s' for all 
j "'i , then this  element lies in F( s' ) . Unanimity says that any unanimously best 
element at s' must also lie in F .  Together, these assumption are c learly weaker 
than no veto power . 
Theorem 3: If F satisfies Property Q, Unanimity and Weak NVP, and I� 3, then F is 
implementable in undominated Nash equilibrium. 
Proof : S ame as that of Theorem 2 with the exception of Lemma 3. In Lemma 3, 
i weak NVP yields that if there is  an equilibirum at s in n3 for some i ,  then the
outcome lies in F ( s) . Part (ii ) yields that if there is an equilibrium at s in 
i D4 A  - n10, then the outcome lies in F ( s) . •
We turn next to the case of two agents. In this c ase, we show that the 
additional (domain) assumption that there exists a socially undesirab le "holocaust" 
alternative suffices for implementation . Such an assumption has been used by 
McKelvey [1985] to obtain strategy space reductions for Nash implementation, and by 
Moore and Repullo [ 1986] for sub game perfect implementation in the 2 agent case. 
We also show that with thi s  assumption, no veto power can b e  replaced with 
unanimity . 
Assumption H: There exi sts w e A such that aPi ( s)w for all aEA, for all i, for 
all s, and w ¢ F ( s) for all s. 
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Theorem 4 :  I f  F satisfies Property Q, Unanimity , H ,  and I ;,; 2 ,  then F i s  
implementable in undominated Nash equilibria. 
Proof :  If I > 2 ,  then Theorem 3 applies . I f  I - 2 ,  we modify the mechanism used 
in the proof of Theorem 2. Note first that with I-2 , o; and D� may have a non-
empty intersection . We let g(m) w if m E oi for any i .  Second, since x E F(s)
i i is never a worst element for any i and s ,  we let the outcome in o9 A  and 09 8  be
determined as in 010 . I t  can now be checked that Lemmas 1 , 2 , 3 ,  and 5 still hold.
i In Lemma 3 ,  m E o3 is never an equilibrium outcome at any s s ince either agent can
unilaterally move m to o1u o2 and get x p
i ( s)w .  Finally, unanimity ens ures that
i if m is an equilibrium at s in o4 A - 010 , g (m) E F(s) .
•
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V. Discussion and Conclusions 
Our res ults show that in general collective choice problems , virtually all 
welfare criteri a  are implementable in undominated Nash equilibri um. In thi s  
section we comment on some features of our analysis . 
Undominated Nash equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept 
which is weaker than Selten ' s  [1975] notion of a (trembling hand) perfect 
equilibrium (see van Damme [1983] for a discussion of this point). One advantage 
of UNE over perfection is that it is easy to define for infinite games ,  while 
extensions of perfect equilibrium to infinite games can lead to weakly dominated 
strategies being played in equilibrium .  In  our setting, it is natural to  work with 
infinite games . If the set of alternatives ,  A, is infinite ( as would be the case, 
for example, if A was the set of feasible allocations in a pure exchange economy), 
then the set of preferences over A is also infinite, and any game which involves 
elicitation of preferences will naturally involve an infinite strategy space . In 
this sense , UNE is a more natural concept of equilibrium for our setting than is 
perfection. On the other hand, there are games for which UNE outcomes can appear 
"unreasonable" relative to perfect equilibrium outcomes . This does not pose a 
problem for our results s ince our game is constructed to have only "reasonable" UNE 
outcomes , where "reasonable" is specified by the welfare criterion . This argument 
also applies to any further refinement of Nash equilibrium .  It should also be 
noted that in the characterization of perfect equilibrium in term of lexicographic 
Nash equilibrium (see Br andenburger and Dekel [1986], Blume [ 1986]), perfection 
requires s trong ass umptions on "higher order" beliefs while the relaxation of these 
ass umptions yields undominated Nash equilibrium .  
Our next comment concerns the size of  the mechanism we  cons truct. This 
mechanism may appear to be unintuitive and complicated. These complications are 
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due to the fact that we constructed a single mechanism to implement any SCC 
s atisfying our conditions . Consequently, we were not able to use information which 
might be specific to a given problem. For example, the mechanism cons true ted i n  
Palfrey and Srivastava [1986b] for pure exchange economies i s  much simpler than the 
one constructed here, but uses several important features of the pure exchange 
mode l .  Further, as the examples in Section II show, in  many cases the implementing 
mechanism is quite simple . 
We t urn next to the implications of our res ults . The res ults provide a general 
possibility theorem and show that noncooperative behavior is consistent with an 
extremely l arge class of welfare criteria. Since p art of the motivation for our 
analysis was that previously studied equilibrium notions were unable to implement 
several important welfare criteria, this is a strong positive res ult insofar as UNE 
allows us to implement most sec' s .  On the other hand, oor res ults also show that 
noncooperative behavior imposes virtually no restrictions on ootcomes attainable as 
equilibri a  to games , implying that the theory has very little predictive power .  In 
this l ight , o ur res ults may be construed as being negative in nature . 
Finally, we note that we have limited the analysis to situations of complete 
informat ion. lfilile no general results are as yet available for the case of 
incomplete information, a characteriz ation of undominated Bayesi an implementable 
allocations in pure exchange economies is given in Palfrey and Srivastava [1986c]. 
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APPENDIX  
Proof of Lemma 2 :  
Consi der any i .  There are three types of deviations i can make : 
where i=i1 (s , s ' )  for some s '  
where i=i2(s , s ' )  for some s '  
( i i i) any other deviation . 
Case ( i): Consi der mj = (x, s , s '  , - 2 , 0 , s ) Vj ,.i . 
- i i i Then, ( m  , m  ) E D4A while
- i i i -- i i - i i • ) Th f ( m  , m ) E D6A ' so g(m , m ) - y1 (s , s ' )  and g ( m  , m ) - y2(s , s  
. ere ore
if i plays mi instead of mi , the outcome changes from y1 (s , s ' )  to
y2(s , s ' )  when all other agents play m
j . By definition of y1
so that agent i is s trictly worse off in this case . Hence, 
dominate mi .
i and y2, y1 P ( s)y2,
mi does not weakly
Case (ii) :  First note that if (x, s , s' , - 3 , ki, si) weakly dominates 
i m ' then so
does (x, s , s '  , - 3 , ki , s ), because the l ast element of i ' s  message i s  only used  in
DiB to determine z* and in D10 to determine i ' s  best element when i-i*. In
either c ase, i is at least as well off playing (x, s , s '  , -3 , ki , s )  as by playing
(x, s , s '  , -3 , ki , si). Without loss of generality, therefore, we let
i i - i - i i - i i m =(x, s , s '  , - 3 , k  , s ). For any m , consider g ( m  , m ) and g ( m  , m  ),
- i i i i observe that the o utcome is only affected when ( m  , m  ) E D4B U DSB'
and 
If 
mj=(x, s , s " , -4 , 0 , s )  Vj ,.i and i-i2( s , s " )  and s ""s ' ,  the outcome c an change from
z1 ( s , s " )  in D!B to e ither z
*( s , s , s " )  or z1 ( s , s " )  in D�B' By definition of z1 (s , s " )
and z (s s " )  z Ri ( s )z , s o  z*( s , s , s " )  = z ( s , s " ), and the 2 J I 1 2 1 
j _-i i does not change . If m = (x, s , s '  , -4 , 0 , s )  Vj ,.i, (m , m  ) E 
outcome therefore
h h f ( ' )  t ( s ' )  However, z ( s , s ' )R
i ( s)z (s , s ' )so t e outcome c anges rom z1 s , s  o z2 s ,  · 1 2 
- i i i (_-i _i) Di d th t is so i is no better off. If ( m  ,m ) E o5B then m ,m E lB an e o u  come 
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* i either z (s , s , s 11 )  or z1 ( s , s " )  in n78 .  Again, since z*(s , s , s " )  = z1 ( s , s" ) ,
the outcome does not change . We conclude that g(m- i , mi )Ri (s )g (m- i ,mi )
for all m- i , so that mi does not weakly dominate mi .
Case iii : i Any other deviation by i moves the aggregate message from D1 to D3 .
There are two cases : xPi (s )wi (s ) and wi ( s )Ri ( s )x .  If xPi (s )wi ( s )
then i is s trictly worse off by swi.tching from mi . If wi (s )Ri (s )x ,  so that x
is a worst element for i at s ,  consider mj - (x , s , s , i , O , s )  Vj�i . Then ,
(-m- i , mi ) E i _- i _i i i i D9A while (m , m ) E D9B ' and the outcome changes from b ( s )  to w (s ) .
If bi ( s ) Pi ( s ) wi ( s )  then i is strictly worse off by switching from mi . If
i i i w ( s ) R  ( s )b ( s )  then i is completely indifferent between all alternatives at s so 
mi is not weakly dominated by any strategy ·•
Proof of Lemma 4 :  
I f  s ' -s then s ince M1 - ( (x , s) I x E F (s ) ) ,  we trivially have x E F(s ) , so 
suppose s�s ' and x ¢ F (s ' ) .  Then either ( i )  or ( ii )  of property Q (Definition 9 ' )  
I .  Suppose ( i )  holds . We claim that mi - (x , s , s '  , - 1 , 2 , s ' ) weakly dominates mi for
agent i1 ( s , s ' ) .  To see this , observe that the change from m
i to mi only affects
- i i i i i the outcome when (m , m  ) E D4A U DSA U DSA " We analyze each case separately.
- i i i i i i i ( 1 )  If (m , m  ) E D4A ' (m
- , m  ) E D6A u D7A . The outcome changes from y1 ( s , s " )  in
D!A to b
i ( s ' )  in D;A ( since k
j - 0 Vj�i) or from y1 (s , s ' )  to y2 (s , s ' ) in D!A ·
i i i By definition, b ( s '  )R ( s '  )y1 ( s , s " )  and y2R ( s '  )y1 •
(2) If (_- i i ) Di (_- i _i ) Di d h wi ( s " )  m , m  E SA ' m , m  E ?A ' an t e outcome changes from to
bi ( s ' )  i f  ki > max kj and remains at wi ( s " )  otherwise . When s" - s '  and kj-1
j;-< i  
Vj�i , i i s  s trictly better off s ince by definition of i1 ( s , s ' ) ,  
bi ( s ' ) Ri ( s ' )wi ( s ' ) .
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( 3 )  (m- i , mi ) E D!A => (m
- i ,mi ) E D!A · The outcome either remains at w
i ( s " )  or
changes to bi ( s ' ) .  In either case , i is no worse off .
Hence , if i-i1 ( s , s ' ) ,  i is no worse off anywhere and is strictly better off as 
described in ( 2 ) , so mi weakly dominates mi at s ' .
I I . Suppose ( ii )  holds . We claim that mi - (x , s , s '  , - 3 , 2 , s ' )  weakly dominates m
i
for agent i2 ( s , s ' ) .  To see this , observe that the change from m
i to mi only affects
the outcome when (m- �mi ) E D!B u D;B . We analyze each case separately .
( 1) If (m- i , mi ) E D!B ' (m
- i ,mi ) E D!B U D;B . When (m
- i ,mi) E D!B ' then the
outcome changes from z1 ( s , s ' ) in D!B to z2 (s , s ' )  in D!B ' and i is strictly better
off s ince by definition, z Pi ( s ' ) z  . If (m- i mi ) E Di the outcome either2 1 ' 7B ' 
changes from z1 ( s , s " )  to z*( s '  , s , s " )  or remains z1 ( s , s " ) .  In either case , i is no 
worse off . 
( 2 )  If (m- i , mi ) E D;B ' (m
- i ,mi ) E D;B ' and the outcome either changes from z1 ( s , s " )
to z*( s '  , s , s " )  o r  remains a t  z1 (s , s " ) .  In either case , i is no worse off . 
Hence , i f  i-i2 ( s , s ' ) ,  i is no worse off anywhere and is strictly better off as
described in (4) ,  so mi weakly dominates mi at s ' .
To conclude , if x ¢ F(s ' )  then mi is weakly dominated, so that if
mj - (x , s , s , 0 , 0 , s )  Vj is a UNE at s ' �s , then x E F(s ' ) . •
Proof of Lemma S :
As in Lemma 4 , without loss o f  generality ,  we may assume that 
s ' �s and x ¢ F ( s ' ) .  Then either (i )  or ( ii )  of Definition 9 '  hold .  
If ( i )  of Definition 9 '  holds , consider agent i - i1 ( s , s ' )  
(a ) I f  i is playing mi - (x , s , s , 0 , 0 , s ) , then the same argument a s  in
Lemma 4 can be used to show that mi is weakly dominated .
(b) If i is playing mi - (x , s , s '"' , - 1 , ki , s ' ) ,  we claim mi - (x , s , s '"' , - 1 , k
i+l , s ' )
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i weakly dominates m To see this , note that the change from mi to mi only affe c t s
the outcome in D;A and in D!A · In D;A ' when mj - (x , s , s '  , - 2 , ki , s ) Vj�i ,
the outcome changes from wi (s ' )  to bi ( s ' ) ,  and i is strictly better off . For
j - i i i any other m , j�i , such that (m , m  ) E D?A ' i is no worse off .
- i  i i h h f wi ( s " )  to bi (s ' )  or remain theIf (m , m  ) E DBA ' t e outcome can c ange rom 
same . In either case ,  i is no worse off . - i i i _- i i u -m- iHence g (m , m  )R ( s ' ) g(m , m ) ' 
- i i i -- i i h _j ( • 2 ki ) v .  �i and g(m ,m ) P  ( s ' )g (m , m ) w en m - x , s , s  , - , , s  J  , 
so that mi weakly dominates mi .
(c) i is playing mi - (x , s , s " " , - 1 , ki , si ) for si�s · Again , changing from
s i to s '  never hurts i ,  so mi given in (b) weakly dominates mi .
i i ( " "  3 ki • ) (d) i is play ng m - x , s , s  , - , , s  . First ,  we claim that if 
. i . . . z2 ( s , s ) P  ( s ' ) z1 ( s , s )  for some s such that i = i2 ( s , s ) ,  then
mi (x , s , s " " , - 3 , ki + l , s ' )  weakly dominates mi . To see this , note that the change
i i  i i Wh _j 
A i i from m to m only affects the outcome n D7B . en m = (x , s , s , -4 , k  , s ) V j� ,
the outcome switches from z1 ( s , s ) to z
* ( s '  , s , ; ) - z2 ( s , s )
• i • i i 1 b tt ff Further , i is nosince z2 ( s , s ) P  ( s ' ) z1 ( s , s ) , and i s str ct y e er o . 
worse off for any m- i such that (m- i , mi) E D;B . This establishes the claim.
Suppose , then , that z1 ( s , ; )Ri (s ' ) z2 ( s , ; ) for all ; such that i = i2 ( s , ; ) ,  In
this case , z* ( s '  , s , ; ) 
. iweakly dominates m 
z1 ( s , s )  for all such s ,  and we claim m
i = (x , s , s '  , - 1 , 2 , s ' )
To see this , observe that the outcome can 
h i Di u u Dl
i
B ' and we handle each case separately :only c ange n 4A . . .  
- i i i - i i i i f (_- i  _i ) Di th t ome( i )  I f  (m , m  ) E D4A then (m , m  ) E D6A u D7A ' I m , m  E 6A ' e OU c 
' )  ( ' )  and by definition, y Ri ( s '  )y , so i is nochanges from y 1 ( s ,  s to y 2 s ,  s , 2 1 
worse off. I f  (m- i , mi ) E D;A ' the outcome changes from y1 (s , s " )  to bi (s ' )  since
kj - O Vj�i , and i is no worse off .
- i i i h (_- i _i) i ( ii )  I f  (m , m  ) E DSA t en m , m  E D?A '
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When mj - (x , s , s '  , - 2 , 1 , s ) Vj�i , the
outcome changes from wi (s ' )  to bi (s ' )  and i is strictly better off . For any
other m- i  such that (m- i , mi ) E D;A ' i is no worse off .
( i ii )  (m- i , mi ) ¢ D!A u DiA
( iv) If (m- i , mi ) E D�A then (m- i , mi ) E D!A ' and the outcome either remains wi ( s " )
or changes to bi ( s ' ) .  
- i i i (v) (m ,m ) ¢ D4B u 
In either case ,  i is no worse off.
i DSB
(vi) If (m- i , mi ) E D!B then (m- i , mi) E D!B , and the outcome changes from Z2 ( s ,  s " )
to z1 ( s , s " )  and i is no worse
(vii )  If (m- i , mi) E DiB then
off since by hypothesis z1 ( s , s " ) R
i ( s ' ) z2 ( s , s " ) .
(_- i _i ) E Di so the outcome remains at z1 ( s , s " ) .m , m  4B 
To summarize , i is no worse off anywhere and strictly better off in ( i i )  above , 
so mi weakly dominates 
(e ) i is playing mi 
i m .
(x , s , s 11 11 , - 3 , k1 , s i) ,  s i"'s ' .
Again , changing from . si to s '  never hurts i at s ' , and the argument in (d)
applies . 
To summarize , i f  ( i )  of Definition 9 '  holds , then mi is weakly dominated .
Suppose then that (ii )  of Definition 9 '  holds , and consider agent i=i2 (s , s ' ) .
( f) i is playing mi (x , s , s " " , - 3 , ki , s ' ) .  We claim that mi=(x , s , s " " , - 3 , ki+2 , s ' )
i weakly dominates m To see this , note that the outcome
i can only change in D?B ' S ince z (s , s ' ) P
i ( s ' ) z  ( s , s ' ) ,  z*( s ' , s , s ' )  = z2 ( s , s ' ) ,  so2 1 
when mj- (x , s , s '  , -4 , ki + l , s ) , the outcome changes from z1 ( s , s ' )  to z
*( s '  , s , s ' )  and
i is 
(g) 
s trictly better 
i is playing mi
off . For any - i _- i _i ) i m such that (m , m  E D?B ' i is no worse off .
- (x , s , s ' " , - 3 , ki , s i) ,  siP's ' . Again , switching from
s1 to s '  never hurts i ,  and the argument in (f) applies .
i i ) Here , _mi - (x , s , s 11 11 , - l , ki+2 , s ' )(h) i is playing m - (x , s , s " " , - 1 , k  , s '  . 
weakly dominates mi . i To see this , note that the outcome only changes in DBA '
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i is s trictly better off when mj- (x , s , s '  , - 2 , ki+l , s )  Vj,.i , and i is no worse off
anywhere else . 
( i )  Finally, if i is playing mi = (x , s , s " " , - 1 , ki , si ) ,  si"s ' ,  switching s
i
to s '  never hurts i ,  and case (h) applies . 
To conclude the proof of Lemma 5 ,  if x ¢ F(s ' ) ,  then mi is weakly dominated , so
if m E D2 is a UNE at s '  with m� - (x , s ) Vj then x E F ( s ' ) . •
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